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Synesthesia
In synesthesia, a stimulus that is typically associated with one sensory modality such as a sound, induces additional modality-specific experiences that are often, but not always, associated with another modality. 12, 13 For example, the sound of a chime could induce a specific color experience (called a color "photism"). While synesthesia often occurs between different sensory modalities, at least one form of synesthesia, grapheme-color synesthesia, is intramodal. Grapheme-color synesthetes systematically experience particular color photisms when presented with particular alphanumeric graphemes such as an "F" or a "4."
14
In many instances of grapheme-color synesthesia, the formal properties of the inducing grapheme seem sufficient to induce synesthetic color experiences. Researchers refer to this as "lower synesthesia." But in a small subset of grapheme-color synesthetes, color photisms seem to correlate with the inducer's associated meaning, for example, the numerical value of the grapheme rather than just its shape. This latter phenomenon has been called "higher synesthesia."
For instance, it has been demonstrated that higher synesthetes have identical color photisms when perceiving diverse symbols that have the same numerical value, for example, an Arabic numeral "5," a Roman numeral "V," and an array of five dots all might correlate with blue photisms for a five-blue synesthete. 15 Moreover, some grapheme-color synesthetes have different color experiences when shown ambiguous graphemes (such as "13") according to how the grapheme is interpreted. The synesthete ! 239 may have a green photism when the grapheme is situated in the series "12, 13, 14," but a red photism when it is situated in the series "A, 13, C" (presumably when the grapheme is taken as a "B"). This reveals that changes in synesthetic color experiences correlate with changes in the semantic significance ascribed to the grapheme (as opposed to merely its perceived shape). Also, some grapheme-color synesthetes have different color photisms when shifting from attending to an image as a "5" to attending to it as an array of "2's" (see figure 7.1).
16 [Figure 7 .1 near here]
These results provide evidence that some synesthesia is triggered by the numerical values of graphemes. But I want to go a step further and show that these numerical values don't just trigger photisms; they can also enter into the representational contents of higher grapheme-color synesthetes' photisms.
17
Synesthesia and Mathematical Savantism
A small subset of number-color synesthetes have demonstrated a heightened ability to store and recall complex numerical information along with an unusual facility with mental arithmetic. These "synesthete-savants," as we will refer to them, report that color photisms play a critical role in facilitating both abilities. The point here is to demonstrate that the view that their photisms represent numerical values or numbers better explains than alternative proposals the facilitative effect of photisms in their numerical abilities. One of Tammet's unusual abilities is reciting pi from memory up to 22,514 digits.
He credits his ability to store and retrieve these digits to his photisms, which he claims facilitate storage by providing a means of chunking numerical information. He writes:
It is much easier to conceive of the possibility that a human mind might be capable of recalling over 22,500 consecutive digits of Pi, particularly when, as in my case, it is able to "chunk" groups of numbers spontaneously into meaningful images that constitute their own hierarchy of associations.
21
Although the amount of information retained in memory is limited, "chunking" or consolidating individual items into a single meaningful unit allows us to store a greater amount of information. For instance, we can more easily retain a ten-digit telephone number by grouping the digits into three meaningful chunks (a three-digit area code and so on). Consistent with Tammet's report, for the synesthete-savant, a single photism
could act as a means to chunk numerical information by representing or carrying information pertaining to a complex number or series of numbers.
Mental arithmetic is another skill at which synesthete-savants such as Tammet excel. Here, once again, nonsavants are limited by a finite memory. To perform mental arithmetic, all of the numerical information concerning the problem to be solved must be retained in working memory while the process of mental computation is completed. This includes both the original problem information as well as all of the intermediary results that are arrived at during the computational process.
Typical nonsavants, however, can only retain three to four items in working memory at a time. 22 This makes it difficult, or practically impossible, for most to work efficiently with large numbers. Recall that while working out a problem such as 42,239 multiplied by 62,349, the digits to be computed as well as the partial results arrived at along the way must all be retained. 23 To see this point, consider how much easier it is to multiply two two-digit numbers than it is to multiply two four-digit numbers, despite the fact that the same mathematical knowledge applies in both cases. The idea is that representing numbers with photisms might provide synesthetes with a particularly good means for visually encoding information. Color experiences are likely more vivid than the more typical form of visual encoding by orthographic form and when used in conjunction with form could play a reinforcing role. For instance, study participants report that their mathematical images become less vivid when the visual components of working memory are loaded with visual information irrelevant to the task.
Loading also correlates with a decline in arithmetical skill. This correlation between vividness of experience and facility with mental arithmetic is consistent with the fact that more vivid representations of numbers (photisms) can have a facilitating effect on mental arithmetic.
Moreover, the apparently greater vividness of synesthetes' color photisms could relate to the photisms' ability to carry more information. The ability to carry more complex information would explain the synesthete-savant's enhanced computational speed. One promising way of characterizing numerical representations is by the view that such representations are at least partially individuated by, or even identical to, their conceptual roles, the roles they play in cognition, reasoning, decision making, and reporting. 32 To represent a specific number, say four, is to have a representation that plays a specific cognitive role. For instance, numbers have relations to other numbers (4 ! 244 < 5 < 6). We should then expect that numerical representations would play the role of prompting judgments or facilitating reasoning about numbers in a way that reflects these relations.
Numerical representations can be more or less determinate or complex. In this view, a more determinate or complex numerical representation would specify more of the number's relations to other numbers. More complex representations might, in these subjects, facilitate more complex mathematical reasoning by prompting judgments about more of the numbers' complex relationships to other numbers. The synesthete-savant may differ from nonsavants, then, because photisms enable them to have very complex and determinate numerical representations of even very large numbers that carry information about the complex ways those numbers relate to other numbers. 33 Because the savant's numerical representations would already specify this complex set of relations, the savant's mathematical reasoning can be very quick and automatic. In summary, the hypothesis offered is that vivid photisms that exploit the resources of visual memory can carry more information about numbers by representing more cognitive roles relating numbers to other numbers.
Some synesthete-savants report that photisms facilitate their heightened ability to retain numerical information and to very quickly perform highly complex mental 
Inferentialism and Associationism
The previous section offered a view on how photisms' representation of numbers could explain their facility with the performance of mental arithmetic. That view is also consistent with self-reports of synesthete-savants, who attribute their abilities to their color photisms. An alternative explanation, however, may be that photisms themselves don't represent numbers, but rather that synesthete-savants represent numbers in the content of independent thoughts that are derived from photisms. The aim of this section is to cast doubt on the adequacy of this alternative account. If the representational view can account for the facilitative role of photisms, and the alternatives cannot, then the reasonable thing is to adopt the representational view.
Let's consider the alternative view. There are two kinds of cognitive processes by which the representation of numbers might be derived from the photism. Representations of numerical value could be derived from percepts by a routinized associative process-a percept of a numeral "4" leads automatically to a four-belief. Or, based on the photism together with a background belief, we could actively infer that a digit is a certain number, say a "4." We will assume that by inference we mean conscious inference. If the inference were automatic and preconscious, then this view could likely be reduced to the former associative view.
!
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To start, the inferential view is particularly untenable. For one thing, this view is not consistent with Tammet's self-reports about his experience. Tammet describes his mental computations as "rapid, intuitive, and largely unconscious." While it is possible that Tammet's reports do not reflect his mental reality, all else being equal, it is customary to prefer a theory that grants authority to self-reports.
There are additional problems with this view. Synesthetes are subject to special Stroop effects, showing that associations of numbers with colors are accomplished very early in perceptual processing. Higher number-color synesthetes were shown indicators of numbers such as a hand displaying a particular quantity of fingers painted in various colors. They were quicker at identifying the quantity of fingers displayed when they were painted the color ordinarily associated with that number. This suggests that numbers associated with photism color are processed and influential prior to conscious judgments.
Inference is also more cognitively costly than association, and not only are associative processes quicker, they are oftentimes more accurate. For these reasons, it is advantageous for the cognitive system to connect commonly performed inferential processes with routinized associations. Much of learning is just that-a set of propositions and various if-then relationships internalized and routinized into a set of associations. The result is an expertise or skill. If this happens in most commonly repeated inferences, then there is reason to think that it would happen in the case of higher synesthesia as well.
! 247 Can, then, the associative view better explain the computational advantage conferred by photisms?
We said that there seemed to be two skills that distinguish synesthete-savants from nonsynesthetes: the ability to retain more numerical information in memory, including in working memory, and the enhanced speed of their ability to mentally compute very complex problems. Let's look at whether the view that savants derive representations of photisms by an automatic routinized process of association handles these two abilities better than the inferential view and the representational proposal advanced here.
Performing mental computation of large numbers requires that a good deal of numerical information be retained in working memory, and working memory can only hold three to seven items at a time. As previously discussed, on the representational view, synesthete-savants can circumvent this problem because photisms provide a way to "chunk" and so store more numerical information. Mere association between photism and number, however, wouldn't provide any advantage here. For the synesthete-savant to appreciate, much less solve a complex problem, numbers would still first have to be derived from photisms, leaving the synesthete with a working memory taxed to a level comparable to that of a neurotypical subject.
Moreover, the ability to retain more in working memory is necessary, but it is not sufficient to account for the relative difference in computational speed that we see between synesthete-savants and nonsynesthetes. To underscore this point, note that ! 248 synesthete-savants' superior mental computation abilities are evident even in the computation of smaller numbers, such as in multiplying two two-digit numbers. In the representational view, vivid photisms carry information about a number's complex set of relations to other numbers. But in the associative view, after numbers are derived from photisms, the performance of mental arithmetic is ultimately accomplished without photisms, in the same way as it is in neurotypical subjects. This view, therefore, does not offer a corresponding explanation for the synesthete-savants' increased computational speed.
We will now consider a few additional objections to the view that some synesthetes represent numerical value in perceptual experience.
Objections
It has been argued that the view that photisms represent numbers in synesthete-savants has explanatory power and can account, better than alternatively views, for the relative abilities of synesthete-savants at mental arithmetic. But is this view vulnerable to any conclusive objections? In the remainder of this chapter, I want to consider potential objections to the argument presented.
35
The first objection targets the assumption, required in our view, that the content of color experiences can consist of perceiver relative disjuncts, multiple types of properties including those that do not seem obviously visual (e.g., numerical values). When a neurotypical perceiver has a color experience that ascribes color quality q, intuitively, he ! 249 or she represents that the perceptual object it is ascribed to has a particular spectral reflectance or color property. If the above argument is correct, then unlike neurotypical perceivers, the content of at least some synesthetes' photisms is not exhausted by the color properties or spectral reflectance properties that they seem to ascribe. On our view, when the number-color synesthete has a color experience by which a digit is marked green, he or she visually represents the grapheme either to be green or representative of a particular number (or both). 36 Our view, then, requires that visual experiences such as color experiences can have disjunctive contents, that they be capable of representing multiple properties, and that they be capable of representing different types of properties including those that may not be typically associated with color experience.
There is, however, a precedent for the view that a single qualitative experience can represent multiple types of properties, including properties that we do not ordinarily take to be associated with color experiences. Consider studies by Bach-y-Rita implementing the tactile visual substitution system (TVSS). 37 The TVSS takes in visual information about light spectral reflectance through a camera positioned on the subject's head and converts the information to a series of tactile pulses given on the subject's skin.
Subjects trained to interpret the information report experiencing the representations as primarily conveying information about objects located in the spatial field around the subject rather than as information about the objects that are causing the pulses on the skin. Moreover, several have noted that TVSS provides skilled users with information that is more like visual perception than tactile perception.
! 250 individuals concerning their experiences perceiving with the use of their walking canes are similar to the reports of TVSS users. They report representing space using a cane in a way that is similar to the way that sighted people do. The primary objects of perception seem to be objects arranged spatially around one. Blind individuals do not report the object causing sensations of pressure on their hand as the primary object of perception.
What is more, representations derived from TVSS are utilized to fill the same role in modulating behavior as visual representations play in sighted individuals. For example, TVSS users have learned to hit a ball with a bat and to perform assembly-line work.
These are both activities that require that one react quickly to information about the way objects are positioned in space, information about properties that are typically the subject of visual representations rather than tactile. The reaction speed required for performing these actions suggests that the processing upon which it depends is automatic; that is to say that the representations utilized do not depend on a series of long and drawn-out translations. Automaticity of processing is often taken to indicate that a process is noninferential, or at least noninferential in the relevant way. The fact that processing is quick and noninferential suggests that these tactile representations already indicate spatially located objects. This would set a precedent for the view that a sensory quality such as a color experience or a tactile sensation can represent properties that are not typically associated with that modality.
The second objection that I want to consider here is that the view that synesthetesavants' color experiences have disjunctive content may appear to yield counterintuitive
results for the accuracy of some synesthetes' visual experiences. I have proposed that for a given synesthete-savant s, a blue photism may have disjunctive content specifying a color or number and that it represents the grapheme that it projects color onto as either blue and/or a number "4." If s encounters an actual blue numeral "7," but erroneously has a blue photism that projects blue onto the digit, then the color experience represents the digit as either a "4" or to be the color blue (or alternatively to have the property typically associated with blue). It may appear then that our view entails that in this case, s's experience is veridical. Intuitively, however, it seems better to count s's experience as misrepresenting the "4." The fact that our proposal apparently does not make sense of the intuitively erroneous nature of the synesthete's experience in such a case might be taken to count against our view.
It may be tempting to take the problem described above as motivating the view that synesthetes' experiences have conjunctive instead of disjunctive contents. But this would not solve the problem either. In the conjunctive view, whenever a blue-four synesthete BF marks a blue body of water with a blue color quality, BF would thereby be misrepresenting the water to be blue and four. This result seems strange, though. Surely we want to say that a synesthete can veridically represent a colored object. The fact that we cannot appeal to conjunctive content appears to compound the problem for our view.
This objection problematically reads too much into the proposal that has been offered here. Our proposal about the disjunctive nature of the content of at least some synesthetes' photisms can be implemented in two ways. One view is that each time a ! 252 synesthete tokens a color experience t, t itself has the disjunctive content that the object it projects its color quality onto is either a particular color c or representative of a numerical value n (or both). This interpretation could yield the unhappy result discussed above. The alternative view is that color experiences have disjunctive content for a synesthete s such that whenever s's experience instantiates a color quality q, q will either represent that the item is a particular color or that it has a particular numerical value, or q will represent that the item is a particular color and that it has some numerical value. This alternative interpretation does not incur the problems raised above. I have been careful to stay neutral with respect to which of these two versions of the view best describes the synesthete-savant. To the extent that one finds the objection above compelling, he or she may find it better to understand the proposal about the disjunctive content of synesthetic experiences in this latter way.
Conclusion
In recent years there has been a lot of work devoted to better understanding the nature and scope of perceptual representation. Conservatives have argued that perceptual experiences can only represent properties such as colors, shapes, and their respective relations. It was argued here that perceptual experiences can, and in some cases do, represent numerical values. 39 If photisms play the role of facilitating mental calculation that synesthete-savants claim they do, then it seems that the best explanation for this will be that synesthetes' color experiences, or "photisms," represent numerical values. Searle (1983 Searle ( , 1992 , Siegel (2005 Siegel ( , 2010 , and Siewert (1998).
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